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Diffused Surface Water in Wyoming:
Ascertaining Property Owners’ Rights
and Settling Disputes
William P. Elliott II*
Nothing in the world is as soft and yielding as water,
Yet nothing can better overcome the hard and strong,
For they can neither control nor do away with it.1

I. Introduction
Water rights and distribution are perennial topics in Wyoming. Most
water disputes in the state involve applying the prior appropriation doctrine to
determine landowners’ rights to draw water from a defined watercourse.2 The
majority of these disputes never see the inside of a courtroom because Wyoming
vests the State Board of Control (Board) with the authority to decide most water
disputes. 3 Statutory law allows a party “aggrieved by the determination of the”
Board to appeal the Board’s decision to a district court.4 However, very few water
disputes make it even that far, let alone to the Wyoming Supreme Court.5 This
* Staff Attorney, Second Judicial District, State of Wyoming. Mr. Elliott also serves as
an adjunct professor for the University of Wyoming College of Law. He thanks his family for
their continuous support and Professor Harvey Gelb for his sagacious advice on the law and life
in general.
1
Lao Zi, Dao De Jing ch. 78 (Peter A. Merel ed., Aleister Crowley et al. trans., version 2.07
1995), available at http://www.chinapage.com/gnl.
2

See Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 41-3-101 to -115 (2010).

See id. §§ 41-4-101 to -331; see also Anne MacKinnon, Historic and Future Challenges in
Western Water Law: The Case of Wyoming, 6 Wyo. L. Rev. 291, 301 (2006).
3

4

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-4-401.

MacKinnon, supra note 3, at 301 n.37 (citing Brian Shovers, Diversions, Ditches, and
District Courts: Montana’s Struggle to Allocate Water, Mont.—Mag. W. Hist., Spring 2005, at 7)
(“From 1890–1902, Wyoming had reportedly settled 3,900 water rights cases with only five district
court and three supreme court appeals.”).
5
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lack of court decisions should not be seen as a shortcoming of Wyoming’s water
law system. Indeed, Mr. Elwood Mead, the Territorial Engineer for Wyoming
in 1888, whose job was to implement a system for determining water rights,
felt it was important to keep the courts out of the process as much as possible.6
Several years later Mead reported he appreciated how Wyoming had avoided the
pervasive trap that “litigation went with irrigation, as fever with malaria.” 7 The
Wyoming Statutes successfully codified the prior appropriation doctrine with
sufficient clarity while retaining the flexibility necessary to address the unique
characteristics of almost every dispute.8
Wyoming’s prior appropriation system should be commended for its
continuing ability to settle most water disputes in a timely and predictable manner
without court involvement. However, the prior appropriation system, which the
state has stood by for over a century, has limitations. Specifically, it does not apply
to diffused surface water. Diffused surface water is
that which is diffused over the surface of the ground, derived
from falling rains and melting snows, and continues to be such,
and may be impounded by the owner of the land, until it reaches
some well-defined channel in which it is accustomed to, and
does, flow with other waters; or until it reaches some permanent
lake or pond, and it then ceases to be surface water and becomes
the water of the water course, or a lake or pond, as the case
may be.9
In contrast to diffused surface water, the Wyoming Constitution states, “[t]he
water of all natural streams, springs, lakes or other collections of still water, within
the boundaries of the state, are hereby declared to be the property of the state.” 10
In turn, the Wyoming Statutes that codify the prior appropriation doctrine refer
to the “right to use the water of the state.” 11 Thus, Wyoming’s prior appropriation
doctrine applies only to those waters listed in the Wyoming Constitution.12 Prior
appropriation does not control water disputes concerning diffused surface water

6

Id. at 301.

7

Elwood Mead, Irrigation Institutions 247 (photo. reprint 1972) (1903).

8

See generally Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 41-3-101 to -115.

9

State v. Hiber, 44 P.2d 1005, 1008 (Wyo. 1935).

10

Wyo. Const. art. 8, § 1.

11

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-3-101.

See Binning v. Miller, 102 P.2d 54, 59–60 (Wyo. 1940); see also Ide v. United States, 263
U.S. 497, 505 (1924); Riggs Oil Co. v. Gray, 30 P.2d 145, 147 (Wyo. 1934).
12
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because such water is not “the property of the state.”13 This article addresses the
various doctrines courts apply to diffused surface water issues. This article then
determines whether Wyoming would benefit by committing itself to one of these
prevailing approaches.
Jurisdictions and commentators have grappled with diffused surface water
issues for various reasons. For example, altering diffused surface water can negatively
affect the recharge rate or water quality of underground aquifers.14 Negatively
affecting underground water aquifers can have a devastating result because ninetynine percent of rural America gets its drinking water from groundwater aquifers
and approximately twenty-five percent of all fresh water used in the United States
comes from groundwater.15 Of particular concern to many Wyoming landowners,
changing the drainage of diffused surface water can negatively impact agricultural
land.16 In urban settings, shifting diffused surface water has damaged landowners’
buildings and other improvements.17 Thus, it is safe to say diffused surface water
issues can affect nearly every person in Wyoming, directly or indirectly.
Before discussing the established doctrines, this article addresses commonlyused terminology. Diffused surface water is often referred to as simply “surface
water.” 18 Indeed, Wyoming case law has referred to it as such.19 However, the
Wyoming Statutes codifying the prior appropriation doctrine refer to water
governed by the prior appropriation doctrine as “surface water” as well.20
Consequently, to avoid any confusion, this article uses the more precise term
of “diffused surface water,” which is limited to that water arising primarily from
precipitation.21 Additionally, at least one Wyoming case has referred to the water
at issue as “diffused surface water.”22

13
See Wyo. Const. art. 8, § 1; see also Hiber, 44 P.2d at 1008 (describing how the classification of the water at issue, as either diffused surface water or natural stream water, governs the
applicable analysis).
14
Wendy B. Davis, Reasonable Use Has Become the Common Enemy: An Overview of the
Standards Applied to Diffused Surface Water and the Resulting Depletion of Aquifers, 9 Albany L.
Envtl. Outlook J. 1, 27–29 (2004).
15

Id. at 2 & n.6.

See, e.g., Lee v. Brown, 357 P.2d 1106, 1107 (Wyo. 1960) (describing an occurrence where
the construction of a dike by a landowner flooded and destroyed a neighbor’s alfalfa crop).
16

See, e.g., Tompkins v. Byrtus, 267 P.2d 753, 754 (Wyo. 1954) (describing an occurrence
where a landowners’ dam caused diffused surface water to flood a neighbors’ cabin).
17

See, e.g., Mullins v. Greer, 311 S.E.2d 110, 111–12 (Va. 1984); see also 1 Clesson Selwyne
Kinney, Kinney on Irrigation and Water Rights § 654 (2d ed. 1912).
18

19

See, e.g., State v. Hiber, 44 P.2d 1005, 1008 (Wyo. 1935); see also Lee, 357 P.2d at 1108.

20

E.g., Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 41-3-106(a), -115(b) (2010).

21

See Hiber, 44 P.2d at 1008; see also supra note 9 and accompanying text.

22

Bower v. Big Horn Canal Ass’n, 307 P.2d 593, 600 (Wyo. 1957).
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II. The Four Prevailing Approaches
Most jurisdictions around the country apply one of four standards to disputes
involving diffused surface water. The four approaches include: (1) the common
enemy rule, (2) the civil law rule, (3) the modified common enemy rule, and
(4) the reasonable use rule.23 Several courts and commentators add a fifth rule by
including a modified civil law rule.24 Other courts and commentators assert that
there are only three rules and address the modified common enemy rule within
the common enemy rule.25 This article classifies the various theories into four
rules in an effort to conform to Wyoming case law.26 When discussing the civil
law rule, this article addresses the several modifications that have caused some
commentators to classify the exceptions as a separate, fifth rule.27

A. Common Enemy Rule
The common enemy rule is one of the original approaches to disputes involving
diffused surface water and has been referred to as the “common law rule.” 28 As the
name implies, this approach treats diffused surface water as an enemy common
to all landowners.29 Consequently, property owners can take whatever steps they
deem necessary to fight against that common enemy. 30 Further, a landowner is
not liable for any damage that his or her fight against diffused surface water causes
to neighboring property.31 In turn, the neighboring property owner has every
right to cast the diffused surface water back upon the first landowner.32
In its purest form, this approach prevents litigation because property owners
will not be held liable for the consequences of their actions against diffused
surface water.33 Thus, the common enemy rule “would permit a landowner to

23

See Davis, supra note 14, at 8; see also Lee, 357 P.2d at 1108–09.

See, e.g., J.W. Looney, Diffused Surface Water in Arkansas: Is It Time for a New Rule?, 18
U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 393, 404–07 (1996).
24

See, e.g., Heins Implement Co. v. Mo. Highway & Transp. Comm’n, 859 S.W.2d 681, 688
(Mo. 1993), abrogated on other grounds by Southers v. City of Farmington, 263 S.W.3d 603, 614
n.13 (Mo. 2008); see also Peter N. Davis, Drainage, in 59 Waters and Water Rights § 59.02(b)
(Robert E. Beck & Amy K. Kelley eds., 3d ed. 2009) [hereinafter Drainage].
25

26

See, e.g., Lee, 357 P.2d at 1108–09.

27

See, e.g., Looney, supra note 24, at 406.

28

Lee, 357 P.2d at 1108.

29

Looney, supra note 24, at 404.

30

Id.

31

Davis, supra note 14, at 13 (citing Currens v. Sleek, 983 P.2d 626, 628–29 (Wash. 1999)).

32

Lee, 357 P.2d at 1109.

33

Davis, supra note 14, at 14.
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construct dams, walls, levees, or ditches to prevent water from coming onto the
property and would allow a property owner to fill, level, and drain property
without responsibility for resulting damage to neighboring property.” 34 However,
because this rule allows almost limitless alteration to the land without fear of
liability, it can encourage landscape “contests between neighbors that could lead
to a breach of the peace.” 35 Under this theory, the landowner with the higher
embankment often won the landscape and courtroom battles against his or her
neighbor because might “made right.” 36 One treatise colorfully remarks that the
common enemy rule “encourages hydraulic warfare.”37
Originally, this approach was thought to derive from English common law. 38
Now though, most authorities accept that the English law on diffused surface
water was still unsettled when this rule first appeared in the United States.39 Some
have speculated that, though not based on the English law for diffused surface
water, the doctrine may still be grounded in English legal concepts originally
designed to address seawater.40 Regardless of its true foundation, the common
enemy rule likely first appeared in the United States, though not by name, in the
1851 case of Luther v. Winnisimmet.41 It appears that a New Jersey court first used
the term “common enemy” in the 1875 case of Town of Union v. Durkes.42
The rationale underlying the common enemy rule rests in the idea that owning
land gives rise to the owner’s absolute right to take whatever action is necessary
to utilize his or her property.43 This doctrine held favor over the competing
approaches in the nineteenth century because many jurisdictions believed it
would best promote land development and economic growth.44 However, all

34

Looney, supra note 24, at 404.

35

Davis, supra note 14, at 14.

Janet Fairchild, Annotation, Modern Status of Rules Governing Interferences with Drainage of
Surface Waters, 93 A.L.R.3d 1193, § 2 (1979).
36

37

Drainage, supra note 25, § 59.02(b)(2).

Heins Implement Co. v. Mo. Highway & Transp. Comm’n, 859 S.W.2d 681, 688 (Mo.
1993), abrogated on other grounds by Southers v. City of Farmington, 263 S.W.3d 603, 614 n.13
(Mo. 2008).
38

Id.; see also Stanley V. Kinyon & Robert C. McClure, Interferences with Surface Waters, 24
Minn. L. Rev. 891, 899–901 (1940).
39

40

See Looney, supra note 24, at 404.

63 Mass. (9 Cush.) 171, 1851 WL 4749 (1851); see Kinyon & McClure, supra note 39, at
902; Looney, supra note 24, at 404.
41

38 N.J.L. 21, 22, 1875 WL 6958, at *1 (Sup. Ct. 1875); see Butler v. Bruno, 341 A.2d 735,
737 (R.I. 1975); Davis, supra note 14, at 13; Looney, supra note 24, at 404.
42

43

See Looney, supra note 24, at 404–05; see also Heins Implement Co., 859 S.W.2d at 688–89.

44

Heins Implement Co., 859 S.W.2d at 689; see Fairchild, supra note 36, § 2.
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jurisdictions that once followed the common enemy rule now favor one of the
other approaches due to this rule’s obvious harsh results.45 Thus, over the last
century, there has been a distinct exodus away from the pure common enemy rule
in favor of holding neighboring landowners accountable for the harms they cause.

B. Modified Common Enemy Rule
Due to the pure common enemy rule’s harsh results, jurisdictions began to
read limitations or exceptions into the rule.46 Eventually, the many exceptions to
that doctrine, taken together, became an independent creature in its own right.47
The altered version of the common enemy rule became known as the “modified
common enemy” rule or the “modified common law” rule.48 The following are
the more prominent exceptions found in the modified common enemy rule:
A. Landowners may block the flow of diffused surface water, but
are prohibited from inhibiting the flow of a watercourse or a
natural drainway.
B. Landowners are prohibited from collecting water and channeling
it onto land of a lower elevation or their neighbor’s land.
C. Landowners who block the flow of diffused surface water
must exercise due care “by acting in good faith and avoiding
unnecessary damage to the property of others.” 49
While most courts using the modified common enemy rule apply their own
specific limitations, all limitations largely encompass a few core principles.50 For
example, the Wyoming Supreme Court has described the primary limitation
as “one must use his own land so as not unnecessarily or negligently to injure
others.” 51 Other commentators have summarized the modified common enemy
rule as imposing liability where “the landowner acted negligently in actions taken
to protect the property.” 52 In this regard, the modified common enemy approach

See Davis, supra note 14, at 10, 13–14. Pennsylvania still applies the strict common enemy
rule but only to land in urban areas. Id. at 10 (citing Fazio v. Fegley Oil Co., 714 A.2d 510, 512 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1998)).
45

46

See Davis, supra note 14, at 15; Looney, supra note 24, at 405; Fairchild, supra note 36, § 2.

47

See Fairchild, supra note 36, § 4.

48

See Lee v. Brown, 357 P.2d 1106, 1109 (Wyo. 1960).

Davis, supra note 14, at 15 (footnotes omitted) (citing and quoting Currens v. Sleek, 983
P.2d 626, 629–30 (Wash. 1999)).
49

50

E.g., Currens, 983 P.2d at 630 (adopting the third exception).

51

Lee, 357 P.2d at 1109 (emphasis added) (citing 93 C.J.S. Waters § 114a(2) (1956)).

52

Looney, supra note 24, at 405 (emphasis added).
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uses an analysis similar to a tort action sounding in negligence.53 For example, a
Washington court held that a defendant is not liable for damage he or she causes
by altering the flow of diffused surface water where the defendant exercised “due
care by acting in good faith.”54 Similarly, an Arkansas court stated a landowner’s
right to change the flow of diffused surface water must be exercised with “due
care so as not to inflict injury on a neighboring landowner ‘beyond what may be
fairly necessary.’” 55
This small sample of cases demonstrates that, like the pure common enemy
rule, the modified common enemy approach permits a landowner to alter the flow
of diffused surface water. The modified common enemy rule, however, was the
courts’ attempt at minimizing the harshness and strictness of the pure common
enemy rule.56 Whereas the original common enemy rule never imposed liability
upon a landowner for diverting diffused surface water, the modified common
enemy rule began to impose liability where the defendant had acted maliciously,
unreasonably, or negligently.57 Notably, both approaches accept the idea that
damage to a neighboring landowner may occur without redress. For example, a
landowner who exercises due care while diverting or impounding surface water
would not be liable under either theory.58
It can be difficult to ascertain exactly which states apply one of the four
approaches because several jurisdictions have not adopted one of the prevailing
labels and instead apply general principles that conform to one of the rules.59
However, another commentator asserts that eleven states currently apply the
modified common enemy rule.60 As this relatively small number indicates, states
have exceedingly abandoned all versions of the common enemy rule.61

53

See Davis, supra note 14, at 27.

54

Currens, 983 P.2d at 630.

55

Pirtle v. Opco, Inc., 601 S.W.2d 265, 266 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980).

See Haferkamp v. City of Rock Hill, 316 S.W.2d 620, 625 (Mo. 1958); see also Looney,
supra note 24, at 405.
56

57

See Fairchild, supra note 36, § 4.

See, e.g., Morris v. McNicol, 519 P.2d 7, 10 (Wash. 1974) (stating that Washington’s
modified common enemy doctrine prevents liability “if the upland landowner’s use is reasonable”).
58

59
See, e.g., Peak v. Parks, 886 So. 2d 97, 103–04 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003) (requiring the plaintiffs
to prove “wantonness” but never identifying the principle as the modified common enemy rule);
Williamson v. City of Hays, 64 P.3d 364, 371–72 (Kan. 2003) (referring to the “common-enemy
doctrine” while addressing the case as a cause of action for negligence).
60

Davis, supra note 14, at 10–11.

See, e.g., Heins Implement Co. v. Mo. Highway & Transp. Comm’n, 859 S.W.2d 681,
690–91 (Mo. 1993) (abandoning the modified common enemy rule and adopting the reasonable
use rule in its stead), abrogated on other grounds by Southers v. City of Farmington, 263 S.W.3d 603,
614 n.13 (Mo. 2008).
61
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C. Civil Law Rule
The antithesis to the pure common enemy rule is the civil law rule, which is
also referred to as the “natural flow doctrine.” 62 In its strictest sense, the civil law
rule is diametrically opposed to the common enemy rule and holds that diffused
surface water must be allowed to follow its natural course without interference
from human development.63 The Wyoming Supreme Court has described the
civil law rule in terms of easements and servitudes:
[A]s between the owners of higher and lower ground, the upper
proprietor has an easement to have surface water flow naturally
from his land onto the land of the lower proprietor, which is
subject to a corresponding servitude, and . . . the lower proprietor
has no right to obstruct its flow and cast the water back on the
land above.64
It is important to note that these easements and servitudes extend only to the
location and amount of diffused surface water drainage that would naturally
occur.65 The upper landowner 66 has no right to increase or decrease the natural
flow upon the lower landowner and, likewise, the lower landowner has no right to
block any part of the natural drainage.67 In direct contrast to the common enemy
rule, stringent application of the civil law rule holds a landowner liable for any
diversion that causes injury to another’s land.68
The rationales underlying the civil law rule are to preserve the natural drainage
pattern of diffused surface water and prevent disputes among neighbors.69 For
example, an Illinois court capably illustrated this justification in terms reminiscent
of caveat emptor or “let the buyer beware”:
As water must flow, and some rule in regard to it must be
established where land is held under the artificial titles created by
human law, there can clearly be no other rule at once so equitable
62
Davis, supra note 14, at 6; Donald V. Dobbins, Surface Water Drainage, 36 Notre Dame
Law. 518, 518–19 (1961).
63

See Fairchild, supra note 36, § 5; see also Drainage, supra note 25, § 59.02(b)(3).

64

Lee v. Brown, 357 P.2d 1106, 1108 (Wyo. 1960) (citing 93 C.J.S. Waters § 114a(1) (1956)).

65

See Dobbins, supra note 62, at 519.

For purposes of this article, the land of an “upper landowner” sits at a higher elevation than
that of a “lower landowner.”
66

67

Dobbins, supra note 62, at 518–19; Kinyon & McClure, supra note 39, at 894.

Heins Implement Co. v. Mo. Highway & Transp. Comm’n, 859 S.W.2d 681, 688 (Mo.
1993), abrogated on other grounds by Southers v. City of Farmington, 263 S.W.3d 603, 614 n.13
(Mo. 2008).
68

69

Drainage, supra note 25, § 59.02(b)(3).
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and so easy of application as that which enforces natural laws.
There is no surprise or hardship in this, for each successive
owner takes with whatever advantages or inconveniences nature
has stamped upon his land.70
Some courts adopted the civil law doctrine, with its associated references to
nature, as the gentler alternative to the harsh common enemy rule.71
It is widely accepted that the civil law rule is rooted in Roman law and traveled
to France where it became part of the Napoleonic Code.72 In 1812, Louisiana
first applied the civil law rule in this country.73 Louisiana continued to apply the
civil law rule in subsequent cases, even before other American states adopted the
doctrine.74 In 1848, Pennsylvania became the first jurisdiction to apply the civil
law rule outside of Louisiana.75 A recent commentator asserts that fifteen states
currently apply the civil law rule to disputes involving diffused surface water.76
As with the common enemy rule, courts grapple with applying a strict version
of the civil law rule to water disputes.77 In its pure form, the civil law rule carries
a tendency to inhibit improvement of land because any improvement likely alters
the natural drainage of diffused surface water.78 Consequently, almost immediately,
courts began to read exceptions or limitations into the civil law doctrine in an
effort to avoid unjust results and allow landowners to improve their property.79

70

Gormley v. Sanford, 52 Ill. 158, 162, 1869 WL 5403, at *3 (1869).

71

See Heins Implement Co., 859 S.W.2d at 688.

72

See Dobbins, supra note 62, at 518; see also Kinyon & McClure, supra note 39, at 894 n.8.

Orleans Navigation Co. v. Mayor of New Orleans, 2 Mart. (o.s.) 214, 232–33, 1812 WL
814, at *8 (La. 1812); see also Kinyon & McClure, supra note 39, at 895. The fact that Louisiana
first applied the civil law rule in this country makes sense because the Civil Code of Louisiana was
based primarily upon the French Napoleonic Code. Kinyon & McClure, supra note 39, at 894 n.8.
73

74
See, e.g., Lattimore v. Davis, 14 La. 161, 164, 1839 WL 944, at *2 (1839); Martin v. Jett,
12 La. 501, 504–05, 1838 WL 881, at *2 (1838).

See Kauffman v. Griesemer, 26 Pa. 407, 415 n.a, 1856 WL 7105 at *7 (1856) (providing
the decision in Martin v. Riddle).
75

76

See Davis, supra note 14, at 11–12.

77

See, e.g., Ratcliffe v. Indian Hill Acres, Inc., 113 N.E.2d 30, 33–34 (Ohio Ct. App. 1952).

See Keys v. Romley, 412 P.2d 529, 533 (Cal. 1966); Butler v. Bruno, 341 A.2d 735, 738
(R.I. 1975).
78

See, e.g., Martin, 12 La. at 505, 1838 WL 881, at *3 (“We are by no means disposed to give
to the code such an interpretation as would, in effect, condemn to sterility the superior estate.”); see
also Kauffman, 26 Pa. at 413, 1856 WL 7105, at *6.
79

It is not however to be understood . . . that because the flow of water must not
be caused by the act of man, that therefore the proprietor who transmits water to
the inferior heritage, is not permitted to do anything on his own land—that he is
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The most prominent modification applies a “reasonableness of use” requirement
to the conduct of a landowner who alters the natural drainage of the land.80 Similar
to the characteristics of the modified common enemy rule, California described
this reasonableness requirement as prohibiting either proprietor, whether an
upper landowner or a lower landowner, from acting “arbitrarily and unreasonably
in his relations with other landowners.”81 That jurisdiction went on to explain
as follows:
If the actions of both the upper and lower landowners are
reasonable, necessary, and generally in accord with the foregoing,
then the injury must necessarily be borne by the upper landowner
who changes a natural system of drainage, in accordance with
our traditional civil law rule.82
Thus, under California’s reasonableness requirement, an upper landowner who
diverts natural drainage will be liable unless the lower landowner acts unreasonably.83
It also holds the upper proprietor liable if he or she acts unreasonably.84 If
both landowners act reasonably, then the strict civil law rule controls and the
upper landowner will be liable for changing the natural flow of the diffused
surface water.
Another well-recognized exception to the civil law doctrine is known as the
“natural watercourse” exception.85 This exception allows an upper landowner
to reroute diffused surface water to a naturally occurring watercourse.86 These
exceptions are just two of many which, taken together, have caused some courts
and commentators to ascribe a separate “modified civil law rule” to the matrix of
diffused surface water law.87 The Wyoming Supreme Court, however, referred to

condemned to abandon it to perpetual sterility, or never vary the course of cultivation,
simply because such acts would produce some change in the manner of discharging
the water.
Kauffman, 26 Pa. at 413, 1856 WL 7105, at *6.
80
See, e.g., Dessen v. Jones, 551 N.E.2d 782, 786–87 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); Ratcliffe, 113
N.E.2d at 34; Bruno, 341 A.2d at 739; Lee v. Brown, 357 P.2d 1106, 1108 (Wyo. 1960); Looney,
supra note 24, at 406.
81

Keys, 412 P.2d at 536.

82

Id. at 537.

83

See id. at 536–37.

84

See id.

85

Looney, supra note 24, at 406.

See, e.g., Pendergrast v. Aiken, 236 S.E.2d 787, 791–92 (N.C. 1977); see also Dobbins,
supra note 62, at 521–22 (describing how the Illinois Legislature passed a statute in the 1800s that
allowed landowners to redirect diffused surface water into a natural watercourse without liability).
86

87

See, e.g., Pendergrast, 236 S.E.2d at 795; Looney, supra note 24, at 406.
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the “reasonableness of use” exception as part of the civil law rule as a whole, albeit
more than fifty years ago.88 For clarity and ease of discussion, later sections of this
article will adopt the term “modified civil law rule” when referring to the body of
exceptions that make up the fifth doctrine.

D. Reasonable Use Rule
Somewhere in between the strict common enemy doctrine (which never finds
liability) and the strict civil law doctrine (which almost always finds liability) rests
the reasonable use rule.89 This principle begins from the basis that a landowner
may alter the drainage of diffused surface water on his or her land because every
landowner is legally privileged to make reasonable use of his or her land.90 Liability
for the landowner’s actions is determined by weighing the reasonableness of the
landowner’s actions against the reasonableness of the harm incurred by his or her
neighbor.91 Under this doctrine, a court will not hold a defendant liable where his
or her actions were reasonably necessary to develop his or her property and the
harm incurred by the plaintiff is not overly onerous.92 In greater detail, the civil
law rule has been helpfully described as follows:
The issue of reasonableness or unreasonableness becomes a
question of fact to be determined in each case upon a consideration
of all the relevant circumstances, including such factors as the
amount of harm caused, the foreseeability of the harm which
results, the purpose or motive with which the possessor acted,
and all other relevant matter. It is, of course, true that society has
a great interest that land shall be developed for the greater good.
It is therefore properly a consideration in these cases whether
the utility of the possessor’s use of his land outweighs the gravity
of the harm which results from his alteration of the flow of
surface waters.93
In its balancing, a court may consider other relevant factors, including: (1) whether
the defendant’s land is appropriately suitable for its intended use, (2) whether
it is impractical to prevent the diffused surface water invasion, and (3) societal
88

Lee v. Brown, 357 P.2d 1106, 1108 (Wyo. 1960).

Heins Implement Co. v. Mo. Highway & Transp. Comm’n, 859 S.W.2d 681, 689 (Mo.
1993), abrogated on other grounds by Southers v. City of Farmington, 263 S.W.3d 603, 614 n.13
(Mo. 2008).
89

90

See Kinyon & McClure, supra note 39, at 904.

See Davis, supra note 14, at 20; Kinyon & McClure, supra note 39, at 904–05; Looney,
supra note 24, at 406–07.
91

92
See Dobbins, supra note 62, at 520 (quoting Armstrong v. Francis Corp., 120 A.2d 4, 10
(N.J. 1956)).
93

Armstrong, 120 A.2d at 10 (citations omitted).
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standards of decency.94 These factors demonstrate that the reasonable use rule sets
forth minimal specific rights or impediments for landowners and instead requires
each case to be determined based on its unique facts.95 Courts and commentators
have compared the reasonable use analysis to that of a nuisance action.96
The reasonable use rule appears to have first surfaced in 1862 in the New
Hampshire case of Bassett v. Salisbury Manufacturing Co. 97 There, the New
Hampshire Supreme Court soundly rejected both the common enemy rule and
the civil law rule before holding that “[t]he maxim, ‘Sic utere,’ . . . therefore applies,
and, as in many other cases, restricts each to a reasonable exercise of his own right,
a reasonable use of his own property, in view of the similar rights of others.” 98 Until
the 1940s, only New Hampshire and Minnesota had adopted the reasonable use
rule.99 However, in 1940, Stanley Kinyon and Robert McClure published their
oft-cited article, Interferences with Surface Waters, in the Minnesota Law Review.100
There, Kinyon and McClure “whole-heartedly” advocated for the reasonable use
approach.101 Since the 1950s, a growing number of jurisdictions have turned
toward the reasonable use rule.102 Kinyon and McClure’s article is often credited
for the rising prominence of the reasonable use standard.103 Regardless of the
reasons for the migration toward the reasonable use rule over the last sixty years,
it is now the dominant approach in the nation, with approximately twenty-one
jurisdictions applying it.104

94

Dobbins, supra note 62, at 520 (citing Restatement of Torts §§ 827–829 (1939)).

Heins Implement Co. v. Mo. Highway & Transp. Comm’n, 859 S.W.2d 681, 689 (Mo.
1993), abrogated on other grounds by Southers v. City of Farmington, 263 S.W.3d 603, 614 n.13
(Mo. 2008).
95

96

See Butler v. Bruno, 341 A.2d 735, 740 (R.I. 1975); see also Davis, supra note 14, at 21.

43 N.H. 569, 1862 WL 1466 (1862); see Kinyon & McClure, supra note 39, at 908
(stating that the reasonable use rule first appeared in Bassett).
97

98
Bassett, 43 N.H. at 577, 1862 WL 1466, at *7. Bassett actually addressed a landowner’s
interference with the flow of subterranean percolating waters, but the reasonable use rule was
applied in the later New Hampshire case of Swett v. Cutts, 50 N.H. 439, 1870 WL 6751 (1870),
which involved interference with the natural drainage of diffused surface water. Additionally, the
New Hampshire court likely was referring to the Latin maxim, “sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas,”
which is loosely translated as “use your property so as not to injure that of another.” See Heins
Implement Co., 859 S.W.2d at 688.
99

Kinyon & McClure, supra note 39, at 908.

100

Id. at 891–939.

101

Id. at 935.

See Pendergrast v. Aiken, 236 S.E.2d 787, 793 (N.C. 1977); see also Butler v. Bruno, 341
A.2d 735, 741 & n.7 (R.I. 1975).
102

103

See Davis, supra note 14, at 20.

104

See id. at 9–10; see also Drainage, supra note 25, § 59.02(b)(7).
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The rationale underlying the reasonable use approach is obvious: it serves as
a middle ground between the extremes of the common enemy rule and the civil
law rule.105 It suggests a moderate alternative to the apparent rigidity of the other
rules.106 More than a century ago, New Hampshire aptly criticized the former
approaches in the following manner:
The frequent hardship and practical injustice of applying one
of these formulas strictly and exclusively has in some cases
apparently resulted in the application of the other, and two
opposing rules have thus been evolved in different jurisdictions
from the inherent injustice of both.107
The reasonable use approach attempts to relieve the inequities and restrictions
that appeared when courts strictly applied one of the other standards.108
In sum, there are at least three and as many as five prevailing approaches
to diffused surface water issues, depending upon how a court or commentator
classifies them. While many jurisdictions abandoned one approach in favor of
another, the vast majority of all jurisdictions have implemented one of these
doctrines.109 Wyoming is one of the few to have never adopted one of the
prevailing approaches, explicitly finding it unnecessary to do so more than fifty
years ago.110 Wyoming courts, however, have faced issues involving diffused
surface water.111 Thus, from a survey of Wyoming’s relevant cases, we can
determine what standards the Wyoming Supreme Court has applied in the past
and what Wyoming landowners can anticipate with regard to their diffused surface
water problems.

III. Wyoming Case Law
A survey of Wyoming case law can help determine which prevailing
approach most closely fits the principles previously set forth by the Wyoming
Supreme Court and aids in defining the various rights and responsibilities of
Wyoming landowners.
105

See Keys v. Romley, 412 P.2d 529, 533 (Cal. 1966).

See id.; see also Pendergrast, 236 S.E.2d at 792–93 (quoting Bassett v. Salisbury Mfg. Co.,
43 N.H. 569, 573, 577, 1862 WL 1466, at *5, *7 (1862)).
106

107

City of Franklin v. Durgee, 51 A. 911, 912 (N.H. 1901).

108

See Dobbins, supra note 62, at 520.

See Davis, supra note 14, at 9–12 (listing forty-nine out of fifty-one jurisdictions, including
the District of Columbia, that follow one of the four approaches outlined here).
109

110
Lee v. Brown, 357 P.2d 1106, 1109 (Wyo. 1960) (“In view of the facts herein, we do not
think that it is necessary in this case to determine what rule in regard to surface water should be
adopted in this state or to what extent it should be applied under particular circumstances.”).
111

See, e.g., id.; State v. Hiber, 44 P.2d 1005 (Wyo. 1935).
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A. Ladd v. Redle
As early as 1904, Wyoming refused to apply the strict common enemy rule to
water drainage:
It is a well-settled proposition of law that one may do as he
will upon his own ground, provided it is not to the injury of
others. And there can be no question that a proprietor may fill in
and raise the level of his ground, or erect embankments or dikes
upon it, to protect his premises from overflow; but he has no
right to cast the water upon the ground of another, to his injury.
And if he does so, he is liable in damages.112
It is important to note that Ladd v. Redle did not involve “diffused surface water,”
as defined earlier in this article but instead concerned stream water that had been
diverted from a natural watercourse.113 However, the Wyoming Supreme Court
indicated its unwillingness to adopt the strict common enemy rule through its
application of the above-quoted principle.114 Instead, in Ladd, the Wyoming
Supreme Court suggested that a landowner faces liability for injuriously diverting
water onto the land of a neighbor.115
Additionally, the principle applied in Ladd indicates a landowner can make
improvements to his or her land that alter the natural flow of water. Specifically,
the court noted a landowner “may fill in and raise the level of his ground, or erect
embankments or dikes upon it, to protect his premises from overflow.”116 This
phrase in Ladd seems to negate the strict civil law rule because it acknowledges
that a landowner in Wyoming may alter the natural flow of water. Thus, more
than a century ago, the Wyoming Supreme Court indicated Wyoming would
not adhere to the pure common enemy doctrine or the pure civil law doctrine
but something more moderate. Consequently, according to Ladd, Wyoming
landowners have the right to improve their property but are not immune from
liability for injuries they cause their neighbors.

B. State v. Hiber
Next, in 1935, the court faced a case where the defendant built a dam to
capture the water from a draw that ran through his land.117 The primary issue in
Hiber involved determining whether the draw constituted a natural watercourse
112

Ladd v. Redle, 75 P. 691, 692 (Wyo. 1904).

113

Id. at 691–92.

114

See id.

115

Id. at 692.

116

Id.

117

State v. Hiber, 44 P.2d 1005, 1006 (Wyo. 1935).
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or diffused surface water.118 If the draw were a natural watercourse, then the prior
appropriation doctrine would apply.119 In contrast, if the draw were diffused
surface water, then one of the approaches discussed earlier would apply.120 The
trial court held that the draw was diffused surface water and, consequently, the
defendant had the right to impound the draw water on his property.121 The
Wyoming Supreme Court agreed and determined that the draw was diffused
surface water rather than a natural watercourse because, among other factors, it
was dry most of the time and had no clearly defined banks.122
In its decision, the court briefly discussed the common enemy rule and the
civil law rule.123 After summarizing the basic principles of each rule, the court
indicated that neither rule could apply unless the water at issue was surface
water.124 Unfortunately, after finding that the water in question constituted
diffused surface water, the court never expressly applied either standard,
asserting instead:
[T]he case may be said to resolve itself into the question as to
whether or not the defendant has the right to impound water
coming from melting snows and heavy rains, which fall onto
his lands and on a small adjoining area, and which drain into
a depression on defendant’s lands. We think he has that right
under the circumstances disclosed herein . . . .125
While the Wyoming Supreme Court did not apply one of the standards
regarding diffused surface water in Hiber, its decision is nonetheless informative.
Specifically, the Wyoming Supreme Court’s determination that the defendant
could capture the diffused surface water contradicts the strict civil law rule
because it allowed the defendant to alter the natural flow of water on his property.
By building the dam and impounding the diffused surface water, the defendant
changed the natural drainage and deprived lower landowners of the diffused
surface water.126 Thus, in Hiber, the Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed the
defendant’s actions that were in conflict with the strict civil law doctrine in a case
directly involving diffused surface water.
118

Id.

119

Id.

120

Id.; see also supra notes 23–108 and accompanying text.

121

Hiber, 44 P.2d at 1008.

122

See id. at 1010–11.

123

Id. at 1008.

124

Id.

125

Id. at 1011.

Id. at 1008–09 (“As in Nevada, so in this state, it is seldom that any landowner has occasion
to complain of too much water. ‘The cry is, usually, not for less but for more.’” (quoting Boynton
v. Longley, 6 P. 437, 438 (Nev. 1885))).
126
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C. Lee v. Brown
In 1960, the Wyoming Supreme Court entertained a case where the trial
court had applied the civil law rule to a dispute concerning diffused surface
water.127 There, the defendants constructed a dike parallel to the boundary line
of plaintiffs’ land.128 The plaintiffs asserted the defendants’ dike caused diffused
surface water to accumulate and flood the plaintiffs’ land.129 Applying the civil
law rule as instructed by the trial court, a jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs
for damages of $3,224.130 After the jury awarded damages to the plaintiffs, the
trial court issued an injunction against the defendants, enjoining them from
maintaining their dike.131
After briefly summarizing the civil law rule, including the “reasonableness
of use” exception thereto, the common enemy rule, and the modified common
enemy rule, the Wyoming Supreme Court found it unnecessary to apply any of
the prevailing approaches.132 Specifically, the court found that the only issue on
appeal concerned the injunction issued by the trial court, not the jury’s prior
award of damages.133 Though involving diffused surface water, Lee is largely
unhelpful to the analysis save to confirm that, at least as of 1960, Wyoming had
not adopted any of the prevailing approaches to diffused surface water issues.134

D. Moreno LLC v. Fall Creek Properties, LLC
A Wyoming district court recently addressed an issue where a property
developer caused increased diffused surface water to drain upon adjacent land.135
There, the developer raised the elevation of its land, which rested in a natural
depression, to match the elevation of a nearby public street.136 Consequently,
this increase in elevation caused more diffused surface water to drain onto the
now-lower adjacent land, inhibiting the adjacent property owner’s development
of its own land.137 In its written decision, the Second Judicial District Court
of Wyoming discussed Hiber and Ladd in determining it could eliminate the
127

Lee v. Brown, 357 P.2d 1106, 1108 (Wyo. 1960).

128

Id. at 1107.

129

Id.

130

Id. at 1108.

131

Id. at 1108, 1110.

132

Id. at 1108–09.

133

Id. at 1108–10.

134

See id. at 1109.

Decision Letter at 3, Moreno LLC v. Fall Creek Props., LLC, Civ. Action No. 2009-31331
(2d Jud. Dist. Ct., Albany Cnty., Wyo. Sep. 13, 2010).
135

136

Id. at 2–3.

137

Id. at 3.
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strict civil law rule and the strict common enemy rule from its consideration.138
The district court then applied both the modified common enemy rule and the
reasonable use rule in concluding that the landowners of the elevated property
were liable for the increased burden upon the lower landowner.139 Ultimately, the
district court issued an injunction requiring the upper landowners to maintain an
appropriate drainage channel that would direct diffused surface water away from
the lower landowner.140
The district court’s decision in Moreno LLC evidences the unsettled nature of
the law of diffused surface water in Wyoming. The district court applied multiple
approaches to the problem after it was unable to identify a single, dispositive rule.141
The parties in that case did not appeal the decision to the Wyoming Supreme
Court.142 Interestingly, the fact the district court arrived at the same conclusion
after applying two different rules is not an anomaly and will be discussed further
in this article.143
The foregoing summary of prior case law demonstrates that Wyoming has
never adopted one of the prevailing rules with regard to diffused surface water
drainage. However, from this brief survey, we can determine which approach
Wyoming might apply in the future. That determination can help us to ascertain
what rights and responsibilities Wyoming landowners currently possess.

IV. Which Prevailing Approach Fits Wyoming?
First, Ladd and Hiber indicate that Wyoming landowners have a right to
improve their land and, thereby, alter the natural drainage of diffused surface
water.144 Further, Hiber suggests that a landowner may impound diffused surface
water before it drains from his or her property.145 Taken together, these principles
suggest that a Wyoming landowner can change the natural flow of diffused surface
water and decrease the amount of water that would reach a lower neighbor,
contradicting the strict civil law rule.146 Thus, as the district court did in Moreno
LLC, the pure civil law rule should be eliminated from consideration.
138

Id. at 6–8.

139

Id. at 9–11.

140

Id. at 11–12.

141

See id. at 8–9.

See generally id. The district court entered permanent injunctions on November 15, 2010.
As of December 30, 2010, a notice of appeal had not been filed with the clerk of the district court.
See also Wyo. R. App. P. 2.01(a) (requiring a notice of appeal to be filed with the clerk of the trial
court within thirty days from entry of the appealable order).
142

143

See infra notes 160–69 and accompanying text.

144

See supra Part III.A–B.

145

State v. Hiber, 44 P.2d 1005, 1011 (Wyo. 1935).

146

See supra notes 116–26 and accompanying text.
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Second, Ladd also demonstrates Wyoming’s rejection of the strict common
enemy rule. Ladd expressly provided that an upper landowner who casts water
onto a lower landowner is liable for injuries suffered by the lower proprietor.147
However, under strict application, the common enemy rule never finds an
upper landowner liable for his or her actions in dealing with diffused surface
water.148 Therefore, the pure common enemy rule also should be eliminated
from discussion.
With the elimination of the two rules at opposite ends of the spectrum, we
find that Wyoming is likely to join the majority of other jurisdictions and adopt
a moderate approach, attempting to balance the concerns of those involved.149 In
exchange, however, Wyoming must sacrifice predictability. The common enemy
rule is predictable because it keeps litigation to a minimum and clearly delineates
the wide latitude held by all landowners.150 The civil law rule is predictable because
it informs all landowners of their limited rights.151 In contrast, the remaining,
more moderate approaches forego predictability in favor of flexibility.152 The
modified common enemy rule and the reasonable use rule (along with the
modified civil law rule) attempt to balance the rights of all landowners in light
of the circumstances of each case.153 Consequently, under any of the remaining
approaches, the outcome of a case is fact-intensive.
The remaining approaches share many similarities, with the largest one
being their inclusion of “due care” or “non-negligence” as a factor in determining
liability.154 For example, both Washington and Arkansas apply the modified
common enemy rule and require a landowner to exercise “due care” in altering
the drainage of diffused surface water.155 In this regard, the modified common
enemy rule uses an analysis similar to that used in the tort of negligence.156
Similarly, the most prominent exception to the strict civil law rule prohibits
landowners from acting “arbitrarily and unreasonably in his relations with other

147

Ladd v. Redle, 75 P. 691, 692 (Wyo. 1904).

148

See supra notes 31–34 and accompanying text.

Butler v. Bruno, 341 A.2d 735, 741 (R.I. 1975) (“[A]s we enter the last quarter of the 20th
century, no jurisdiction follows the strict requirements of either the common-enemy or the civillaw rule.”).
149

150

Id. at 737.

151

Id. at 738.

152

Id. at 741.

153

See, e.g., Looney, supra note 24, at 404–07.

154

See Butler, 341 A.2d at 739 & n.3.

See Currens v. Sleek, 983 P.2d 626, 630 (Wash. 1999); Pirtle v. Opco, Inc., 601 S.W.2d
265, 266 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980).
155

156

See Lee v. Brown, 357 P.2d 1106, 1109 (Wyo. 1960).
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landowners.” 157 This reasonableness requirement that courts began attaching to
the strict civil law rule came to be called the “reasonableness of use” exception.158
Some courts applying the civil law rule have even gone so far as to require
landowners to exercise “reasonable and ordinary care” in changing surface water
drainage and found that a party breached such a “duty.”159 Thus, courts have used
an analysis similar to that used in the tort of negligence when applying the civil
law rule’s “reasonableness” requirement.
The strict common enemy rule and strict civil law rule found their basis in
rigid property law formulations.160 A Rhode Island court commented on these
unyielding property law bases in a rather disapproving manner:
Both the common-enemy and the civil-law rules are
encrusted with the verbiage that is usually associated with the
law of real property. When they are used, one hears such terms
as easements, the dominant estate, the servient estate, and
servitudes, and the classicist has the opportunity to try his hand
at translating such ponderous Latin phrases as cujus est solum,
ejus est usque ad coelum et ad infernos or aqua currit, et debet
currere ut currere solebat.161
Essentially, in various attempts to lessen the harshness of the strict rules, courts
began overlaying these strict property law formulations with tort principles, most
commonly negligence and nuisance.162 Jurisdictions applying the common enemy
rule or the civil law rule soon began to temper the severity of these doctrines by
attempting to require all landowners to act reasonably under the circumstances.
Instead of attempting to superimpose tort values upon property law principles
to mitigate the unyielding nature of the underlying property law principles,
the reasonable use rule finds its basis in tort law and abandons the concepts of
servitudes and absolute ownership.163 The reasonable use rule examines the facts
of each case, weighs the benefits against the detriments of each landowner, and

157

Keys v. Romley, 412 P.2d 529, 536 (Cal. 1966).

158

Lee, 357 P.2d at 1108; see also supra notes 79–84 and accompanying text.

159

See, e.g., Burgess v. Salmon River Canal Co., 805 P.2d 1223, 1230 (Idaho 1991).

See Butler v. Bruno, 341 A.2d 735, 738–39 (R.I. 1975); see also Kinyon & McClure, supra
note 39, at 936.
160

Butler, 341 A.2d at 738 (footnotes omitted). The Rhode Island court translated the first
Latin phrase as “To whomever the soil belongs, he owns also to the sky and to the depths,” which
refers to the strict common enemy doctrine. See id. at 738 n.1. The court translated the second Latin
phrase as “Water runs, and ought to run as it is accustomed to run,” which refers to the strict civil
law doctrine. See id. at 738 n.2.
161

162

Id. at 739; see also supra notes 154–59 and accompanying text.

163

Butler, 341 A.2d at 739; see also Kinyon & McClure, supra note 39, at 936–39.
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holds a landowner liable only when his or her harmful interference with diffused
surface water is unreasonable.164 Essentially, the reasonable use rule starts at the
point to which the modified common enemy rule and modified civil law rule have
evolved in that all three now incorporate tort principles. Indeed, at least one court
has referred to the modified common enemy rule and the reasonable use rule as a
“distinction without a difference.”165 The reasonable use analysis is very similar to
the analysis for the tort of nuisance.166
Because the modified common enemy rule, the modified civil law rule, and the
reasonable use rule all involve analyses similar to those applied to the tort principles
of negligence and nuisance, it should not be surprising that courts have achieved
very similar results in cases involving similar facts when reportedly applying one
of these different approaches.167 In commenting upon the modifications and
exceptions read into the common enemy rule and the civil law rule over the years,
one court stated, “[T]he two doctrines have been laboriously drifting towards
confluence—and, not coincidentally, toward the third doctrine [reasonable use]
of surface water use.”168 For more than fifty years, courts and commentators have
asserted the common enemy rule and the civil law rule have been modified to the
point that there is no difference between them and the reasonable use rule, that
these three rules are, for all intents and purposes, now one.169 While this view is
not universally held, it demonstrates the growing simplicity and uniformity that
has evolved over the last 150 years.
At this time, it seems that if Wyoming ever officially adopts one of the
prevailing approaches, it should be the reasonable use rule. More jurisdictions
now apply the reasonable use rule than one of the other approaches.170 That trend
is likely to continue in light of the fact that the civil law rule and the common
enemy rule have grown increasingly similar to the reasonable use rule.171 The
primary benefit of the common enemy rule and the civil law rule is predictability,
but the modifications thereto have reduced this predictability and made case

164

See Kinyon & McClure, supra note 39, at 904–05.

Heins Implement Co. v. Mo. Highway & Transp. Comm’n, 859 S.W.2d 681, 690 (Mo.
1993), abrogated on other grounds by Southers v. City of Farmington, 263 S.W.3d 603, 614 n.13
(Mo. 2008).
165

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 833 (1979). The Restatement (Second) of Torts endorses
the reasonable use test as a form of nuisance.
166

167
See Kinyon & McClure, supra note 39, at 934–35 (stating that, in general, under the
common enemy analysis and the civil law analysis, “the actual decisions under both rules are
harmonious”); see also Heins Implement Co., 859 S.W.2d at 689.
168

Heins Implement Co., 859 S.W.2d at 689.

169

See Dobbins, supra note 62, at 525.

170

See Davis, supra note 14, at 9–12.

171

See supra notes 154–69 and accompanying text.
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outcomes far more fact-dependent.172 Thus, the primary benefit associated
with the common enemy rule and the civil law rule has been lost in their
modified versions.
To be certain, the reasonable use rule does not provide clear answers to diffused
surface water questions, and the approach has its own detractors.173 However,
it is in accord with other long-standing legal principles such as negligence and
nuisance.174 In that regard, Wyoming may be at the forefront of this issue by
having refused to adopt one of the prevailing methods. Specifically, as early as
1954, the Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed cases involving diffused surface
water decided at the trial court level based on negligence theories.175 Indeed, since
at least 1940, commentators have asserted that issues involving diffused surface
water are tort issues, not property law issues:
There is no question, however, that one’s liability for interfering
with surface waters, when incurred, is a tort liability. An
unjustified invasion of a possessor’s interest in the use and
enjoyment of his land through the medium of surface waters,
or any other type of waters, is as much a tort as a trespass or
a private nuisance produced by smoke or smells. Nevertheless,
the courts and writers seldom analyze the problems in terms of
tortious conduct, causation or other tort concepts.176
Wyoming, it turns out, was one of the earlier jurisdictions to analyze the problems
in terms of tortious conduct.177

See Butler v. Bruno, 341 A.2d 735, 741 (R.I. 1975) (“With the numerous judicial exceptions
and modifications that have been appended through the years to the two original concepts, we
fail to see how the modern versions of either afford more predictability than the rule of reasonable use.”).
172

173
See, e.g., id. (Joslin, J., dissenting) (stating the reasonable use rule “is no ‘rule’ at all and that
it fails to provide a landowner any reasonably certain standards governing the use of his land”).
174

See supra notes 154–62 and accompanying text.

See Tompkins v. Byrtus, 267 P.2d 753, 754 (Wyo. 1954). There, the plaintiffs alleged
that the defendants’ newly constructed dam had flooded the plaintiffs’ cabin. The plaintiffs sued
for damages, asserting that the flooding was caused by defendants’ negligence. The defendants
countered that the plaintiffs were negligent by failing to provide necessary drainage for their own
property. The jury found the plaintiffs negligent and returned a verdict in the defendants’ favor. See
also Davis, supra note 14, at 12 (“Wyoming has not yet adopted any of the standard rules, relying
instead on negligence theories.”).
175

176
Kinyon & McClure, supra note 39, at 936; see also Pendergrast v. Aiken, 236 S.E.2d 787,
796 (N.C. 1977) (“Analytically, a cause of action for unreasonable interference with the flow of
surface water causing substantial damage is a private nuisance action . . . .”).
177

See Tompkins, 267 P.2d at 754; see also Davis, supra note 14, at 12.
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In sum, in light of national trends and previous case law, Wyoming is
most likely to apply the reasonable use rule to issues involving diffused surface
water. Alternatively, it may continue to apply the stand-alone tort principles of
negligence or private nuisance and entirely avoid adopting one of the prevailing
rules.178 Fortunately for Wyoming landowners, these principles are very similar
or the same.179 Thus, by analyzing these principles, a matrix can be created that
ascertains the fundamental rights held by Wyoming landowners.

V. Determining Wyoming Landowners’ Rights and Duties
Regardless of whether Wyoming chooses to apply the reasonable use rule
or general nuisance or negligence theories, Wyoming landowners’ rights,
responsibilities, and privileges are fairly well-defined. From the previous section’s
analysis of Ladd and Hiber, it is clear that Wyoming landowners possess the right
to improve their property.180 That right must include an inherent right to alter the
contour of the land, by raising or lowering the elevation, and thereby changing the
natural drainage of diffused surface water.181 Hiber goes so far as to suggest that a
Wyoming landowner can impound diffused surface water, thereby depriving his
or her lower neighbor of any water that would drain onto the adjacent property.182
Ladd, however, also shows us that these rights are not limitless. While a
Wyoming landowner can modify the natural drainage of his or her property, he
or she cannot direct diffused surface water upon the land of his or her adjacent
neighbor if it causes unnecessary injury.183
In determining whether a landowner is liable for injury caused to adjacent
property from changing the movement of diffused surface water, the question
of reasonableness is likely to drive the discussion. For example, if a Wyoming
court applied the reasonable use rule, then the trier of fact would resolve the issue
of reasonableness by weighing the benefit to the actor’s land against the harm
that results from altering the diffused surface water drainage.184 This balancing

178

See supra notes 174–77 and accompanying text.

179

See supra notes 160–74 and accompanying text.

Ladd v. Redle, 75 P. 691, 692 (Wyo. 1904) (“[O]ne may do as he will upon his own
ground . . . .”).
180

See id. (“[A] proprietor may fill in and raise the level of his ground, or erect embankments
or dikes upon it . . . .”).
181

182
State v. Hiber, 44 P.2d 1005, 1011 (Wyo. 1935) (stating the defendant had “the right to
impound water coming from melting snows and heavy rains, which fall onto his lands”).
183
Ladd, 75 P. at 692 (providing that a landowner “has no right to cast the water upon the
ground of another, to his injury”).
184

See Armstrong v. Francis Corp., 120 A.2d 4, 10 (N.J. 1956).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol11/iss2/5

22

Elliott: Diffused Surface Water in Wyoming: Ascertaining Property Owners'

2011

Diffused Surface Water in Wyoming

431

test would include considering the following: (1) whether the altered drainage is
reasonably necessary, (2) whether the actor has attempted to avoid unnecessary
injury to the other’s land, and (3) the feasibility of improving the land’s natural
drainage or installing artificial drainage.185 Thus, under the reasonable use rule,
Wyoming landowners have a greater likelihood of avoiding liability if their
drainage alterations provide great utility to their land while causing only minimal
injury to their neighbors.
Similarly, if a Wyoming court applied the tort of negligence to a case involving
injury from diffused surface water alteration, the question of reasonableness again
controls. The Wyoming Supreme Court (along with most other jurisdictions) has
held that all persons hold a general duty of reasonable care when undertaking any
endeavor.186 Applying this principle, a Wyoming landowner always has a duty to
exercise reasonable care when changing the drainage of diffused surface water.
When altering diffused surface water drainage, Wyoming landowners can limit
liability under the tort of negligence by exercising reasonable care in light of all
the surrounding circumstances.187 Thus, in the context of negligence, Wyoming
landowners have a greater likelihood of avoiding liability if their drainage
alterations are “reasonable” in that the alterations provide great utility to their
land while causing only minimal injury to their neighbors.
Finally, if a Wyoming court applied the tort of nuisance to a case involving
injury from diffused surface water alteration, the issue of reasonableness again
rears its head. Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts, an invasion of a person’s
interest in the use and enjoyment of his or her land that results from changing
the flow of diffused surface water may amount to a nuisance.188 As the reader has
doubtlessly predicted by now, the focus of a nuisance analysis is reasonableness.
An actor who diverts the diffused surface water to the injury of his or her neighbor
is liable when the alteration is intentional and unreasonable.189 Likewise, a
landowner’s alteration is unreasonable when the gravity of the harm outweighs the
utility of the actor’s conduct.190 Thus, within the context of nuisance, Wyoming
landowners can reduce their exposure to liability if their drainage alterations are
“reasonable” in that the alterations provide great utility to their land while causing
only minimal injury to their neighbors.

185

See Davis, supra note 14, at 21 (citing Butler v. Bruno, 341 A.2d 735, 740 (R.I. 1975)).

See Andersen v. Two Dot Ranch, Inc., 49 P.3d 1011, 1015 n.4 (Wyo. 2002); see also Vassos
v. Roussalis, 625 P.2d 768, 772 (Wyo. 1981) (“The standard is fixed as that which is required of a
reasonable person in light of all the circumstances.”).
186

See Vassos, 625 P.2d at 772 (stating that a person is required to act reasonably in light of all
the circumstances).
187

188

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 833 (1979).

189

Id. § 822.

190

Id. § 826.
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In sum, regardless of the approach applied by a court, Wyoming landowners
are required to act in a reasonable manner when changing the drainage of diffused
surface water. Reasonableness under any of the potential analyses will be weighed
by comparing the benefit of the landowner’s alteration to the harm suffered by
adjacent property owners.

VI. Conclusion
Wyoming remains one of only a few states to have never expressly adopted
one of the prevailing approaches regarding diffused surface water. Prior case law,
though, suggests Wyoming will not apply the strict common enemy doctrine or
the strict civil law doctrine. That leaves the modified common enemy rule, the
modified civil law rule, and the reasonable use rule as possibly controlling diffused
surface water disputes. The remaining approaches have evolved over the last
century to align, in large part, with the tort actions of negligence and nuisance.
Consequently, in modern times, Wyoming likely stands to benefit little from
officially adopting one of the prevailing approaches. Case law from Wyoming
and commentary from around the nation suggest that the torts of negligence and
nuisance can adequately resolve the issues. Thus, it may be simpler for Wyoming
to apply these ever-present tort principles to diffused surface water issues in
the future.
Despite Wyoming courts’ reluctance to affirmatively abide by a single doctrine,
existing law provides Wyoming landowners with sufficient notice of their rights
and obligations in the context of diffused surface water drainage. Regardless of
which remaining analysis a Wyoming court applies, the concept of reasonableness
will likely control the outcome. As with every other endeavor they undertake,
Wyoming landowners are required to exercise due care when interfering with the
drainage of diffused surface water on their land. A Wyoming landowner exposes
himself or herself to liability for any injury caused by unreasonable intrusion
upon the land of another through diffused surface water. In contrast, Wyoming
landowners can limit their exposure to liability by acting “reasonably” under the
surrounding circumstances when altering the drainage of diffused surface water. A
court is likely to find a landowner acted reasonably under the circumstances when
the landowner’s alterations provide great utility to their land while minimizing
injury to their neighbors’ land as much as possible.
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